We develop an analytical model of knowledge sharing in alliances and alliance portfolios. We show that, once the issue of encouraging e¤ective collaboration is put center-stage, many standard intuitions of the "learning race"view and alliance portfolio literature are overturned or quali…ed. Partners engage in "learning races" in some cases, but exhibit "altruistic" behaviors in other cases. They may reduce their own absorptive capacity, or increase the transparency of their own operations, to facilitate their partner's learning. Our work contributes towards putting the "learning race" literature on a more solid foundation, by explicitly recognizing the importance of encouraging knowledge sharing between partners. In alliance portfolios, we show that not all substitutability between alliance portfolio partners is bad. We distinguish between substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival bene…ts, and show that the latter can be conducive to knowledge sharing.
Introduction
from each other, and how well positioned they are to exploit that learning without the cooperation of the partner (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Das and Teng, 2000; Panico, 2017) .
In many cases, the new knowledge created cannot be accurately foreseen or adequately distinguished from what is already known by the partners. Thus, …rms cannot contract or commit to jointly exploit it. Any existing contract or joint venture terms are subject to renegotiation under the threat that one partner or the other may walk away (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986) . We focus on the need to motivate partners to share knowledge, and study how alliances should be managed and partners selected.
Our focus on encouraging knowledge sharing yields predictions that are often very di¤erent, and sometimes diametrically opposed, from what some leading strategic management approaches would suggest.
A key tenet of the learning race literature (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998) is that "participating …rms [should] maximize their receptivity to the knowledge and skills of their partner while limiting the transparency of their own operations" (Mowery et al., 2002: 298) .
In our framework, …rms can engage in "learning races"in some cases but exhibit "altruistic"behaviors in other cases. This may help explain some apparently puzzling behaviors, such as Toyota's willingness to teach a competitor, GM, the "philosophy"and practice of lean manufacturing (Inkpen, 2005) . It may also help explain why sometimes …rms such as Cisco appear to deliberately reduce their own learning capability (Steinhilber, 2008) , and why failure to do so may lead to disputes, such as in the case of Emisphere and Eli Lilly (Gibbons and Vogel, 2007; Gilson et al., 2009) . Our focus on knowledge sharing also yields the counter-intuitive result that uncertainty about outcomes need not always hinder knowledge sharing.
Instead, greater uncertainty, in the form of mean preserving spreads, may actually facilitate knowledge sharing.
Knowledge sharing may also be facilitated by adding new partners to a dyadic alliance. We examine alliance portfolios where a focal …rm simultaneously manages multiple alliances (Gulati, 1998 (Gulati, , 1999 Gulati et al., 2011; Vonortas and Zirulia, 2015) . Existing research suggests that synergies between partners encourage collaboration, while partner substitutability hinders it by exacerbating competitive tensions (McEvily et al., 2000; Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Lavie, 2007) . However, empirical work on the e¤ects of partner substitutability/similarity has yielded largely inconclusive results (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011; Cui and O'Connor, 2012; Cui, 2013) .
We provide a potential explanation for these mixed results by distinguishing between two types of partner substitutability: substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival bene…ts. Two …rms (A and B) are substitutable (or replaceable) from the perspective of a focal …rm F if they provide F with access to similar knowledge. This knowledge can be used to (i) implement existing projects or (ii) to undertake new 'rival'projects (yielding 'rival bene…ts') when alliances break down. We show that, while substitutability in implementation hinders knowledge sharing, substitutability in rival bene…ts facilitates it. Moreover, synergies in implementation tend to have a larger e¤ect in sustaining knowledge sharing than substitutability in implementation has at hindering it. Overall, our …ndings suggest that substitutability is likely to have a less detrimental e¤ect on knowledge sharing than generally thought.
Our theory has also implications for partner selection. We show that, from the focal …rm's perspective, there is often an inverted-U relationship between alliance value and partner substitutability . The reason is that substitutability has in general two con ‡icting e¤ects: (i) on the focal …rm's payo¤ conditional on knowledge sharing and (ii) on the weak partners' incentives to share knowledge. Because of these con ‡icting e¤ects, F is better o¤ if it chooses partners that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar to each other. Thus, the theory may help explain the non-linear, inverted-U relationships documented by , Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) and Vasudeva and Anand (2011) . This paper contributes toward putting the literature on competitive tensions in alliances on a more solid foundation. Scholars have noted that many of the learning race view's recommendations su¤er from a failure to recognize that the processes of value creation and value appropriation are inextricably linked (e.g., Zeng and Hennart, 2002) . Scholars have also argued that the notion of a race to learn is "largely unrealistic,"for it is unclear what would motivate a likely loser to join the race (Inkpen, 2002: 272) . This paper incorporates a knowledge sharing constraint into a model of learning in alliances, and shows that its inclusion has important consequences for how alliances should be managed. In particular, the model may help explain why, although learning is an important goal in many alliances, only few …rms actually appear to have a racing intent (Mowery et al., 1996; Hennart et al., 1999; Inkpen, 2000) .
A second contribution of the paper is to re-orient attention in strategy and economics from the problem of how weak …rms can protect their intellectual assets in collaborations (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Katila et al., 2008; Hallen et al., 2014) , to the problem of how leading …rms can promote the health of their innovation ecosystems. Iansiti and Levien (2004) distinguish between "keystone organizations", which share the bene…ts from asset orchestration with their partners, and "physical dominators", which focus on value appropriation. This work examines di¤erent strategies-strategic investments in absorptive capacity, alliance portfolio management, and contractual solutions-that keystone organizations can use to create ecosystems conducive to knowledge sharing and innovation.
Related literature
The paper is related to several strands of the literature on organizations. Resource dependence theory (RDT) is a leading theoretical framework that emphasizes the importance of power in inter-…rm relations.
RDT contends that power in a relationship is held by the partner that controls the most critical resources (Pfe¤er and Salancik, 1978) . RDT scholars have distinguished between joint dependence-where both parties hold critical resources-and dependence asymmetry, where power is asymmetrically distributed (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2007; Gulati and Sytch, 2007) . However, to the extent that control over resources is a …xed attribute of a …rm, both notions are essentially static.
A number of papers have examined the dynamics of power in alliances. One critical resource which is hard to protect e¤ectively and may spill over during collaboration is knowledge (Liebeskind, 1996) .
Information leakage is often cited as a major drawback of alliances (Arora and Merges, 2004; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2007; Li et al., 2012) . Indeed, some compare the experience of some young technology …rms collaborating with more established incumbents to "swimming with sharks" (Katila et al., 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Hallen et al., 2014; Colombo and Sha…, 2016) . Knowledge spillovers may also shift the balance of power in favor of the partners that learn the fastest, giving rise to "learning races" and instabilities (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997) .
The literatures on "sharks"and "learning races"largely focus on how …rms can protect their intellectual assets. For instance, Katila et al. (2008) …nd that new …rms enter corporate investment relationships when their …nancial and managerial resource needs are high, and when they can defend themselves against misappropriation through defense mechanisms. One important safeguard is the choice of partners with limited opportunistic intent, as measured for instance by "relative scope" (Khanna et al., 1998; Baum et al., 2000) or by alliance type (Dussauge et al., 2000) . Other important types of safeguards include patents, secrecy, timing, social defenses and organizational …rewalls (Cohen et al., 2000; Katila et al., 2008; Hallen et al., 2014) .
Our theory, while noting that "weak" …rms may seek to protect their intellectual assets, emphasizes the actions that leading or "strong" …rms may take to encourage knowledge sharing. These actions can include voluntarily reducing their own absorptive capacity through "Chinese walls" or other means, or increase the transparency of their own operations.
By examining alliance portfolios, the paper also contributes to a better understanding of how network structure in ‡uences knowledge sharing (Hansen, 1999 (Hansen, , 2002 Argote et al., 2003; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Hansen et al., 2005; Gulati et al., 2011) . Structural factors that have been found to a¤ect knowledge sharing in networks include social cohesion around a relationship (Hansen, 1999; Reagans and McEvily, 2003) , the variety of knowledge sources within which a …rm is embedded (Burt, 1992; Zaheer and McEvily, 1999; Baum et al., 2000; Reagans and McEvily, 2003) and competitive tensions among the members of a group (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Baum et al., 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) . The similarity of knowledge sources within a network has typically been seen as an obstacle to e¤ective knowledge sharing, both because it reduces knowledge variety and because it creates competitive tensions (e.g., Baum et al., 2000) . However, empirical …ndings have been mixed (e.g., Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009; Cui 2013) . Our work may help reconcile these mixed …ndings by highlighting a type of knowledge redundancy (substitutability in rival bene…ts) that can actually foster knowledge sharing.
From a modelling perspective, our model builds on the modern property-rights theory of the …rm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; de Fontenay and Gans, 2005) . However, while most of the property-rights literature explains ine¢ ciencies and underinvestment as the outcomes of a public good problem-the unwillingness of transaction partners to privately contribute to joint value creationwe highlight shifts in outside options. In so doing, we establish a formal connection between the mutual dependency and learning races literatures in strategy, and the property-rights literature in economics.
Panico (2017) also shows in a property-rights setting that alliance partners can engage in tactics to enhance their bargaining positions. However, unlike Panico, we focus on knowledge sharing, and show that partners may strategically weaken their own bargaining positions. We also examine the e¤ects of uncertainty, and analyze alliance portfolios.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. There we show how shifts in bargaining positions can destabilize alliances, and how di¤erent types of uncertainty a¤ect knowledge sharing. Subsequent sections examine solutions to the problem of suboptimal knowledge sharing. The solutions we consider are: strategic choice of learning capabilities (Section 3), alliance portfolios (Section 4), and contracts (Section 5). Section 6 concludes. All omitted proofs are in Appendix A.
Model
There are two …rms, F and A, that can collaborate. We will sometimes refer to …rm F as the 'focal'…rm, because it may be involved in more than one collaboration.
Collaboration involves two stages. In the …rst stage, F and A can share knowledge about their technology and markets. In the second stage, they must decide whether to continue to work together and implement a project. An example would be Technip and Schlumberger sharing information to jointly develop subsea integrity and surveillance solutions for ‡exible pipes used in deep o¤shore oil and gas production. 1 Implemention consists of bringing the new product to market.
The key assumptions we make are that (i) it is impossible to contract on knowledge sharing, and that (ii) the …rms cannot commit ex ante (before knowledge sharing) to implement the project together ex post. These assumptions imply that the …rms cannot be forced to collaborate, neither in the initial phase of knowledge sharing nor the subsequent implementation phase. This could be because it is impossible for a court to verify, for instance, that a …rm has done its best to transmit its knowledge, or that a partner is performing in a consummate rather than perfunctory fashion during co-development. In countries with less developed institutions, these assumptions may also re ‡ect very high costs of using the legal and judicial system.
To determine whether it is privately pro…table for a …rm to share knowledge with a partner, we need to specify the payo¤s associated with di¤erent strategies. If F and A do not share their knowledge, then the collaboration does not get started and we assume that F and A obtain their "baseline"payo¤s, which we normalize to zero.
A second possibility is that F and A share their knowledge. The payo¤ they get from knowledge sharing depends on whether they implement their project together or terminate their collaboration prematurely.
If the …rms implement the project together, the joint value they create is V . If they terminate their collaboration prematurely (before implementation), each …rm applies the knowledge it has gained in its existing markets. Thus, F gets F and A gets A . For instance, consider the collaboration between Mobil, which developed new zeolite-based catalyst for petroleum re…ning, and Badger, which had expertise in the design and engineering of these processes. The collaboration involved Badger developing a new re…ning process using Mobil's zeolite catalyst, and drawing upon the internal data and know-how that Mobil had developed around the performance of the catalyst. The collaboration envisaged that the new process would be used by Mobil internally and o¤ered commercially by Badger to other oil companies, as a part of its engineering and design business, with Mobil getting a share of the licensing royalty income. 2 In terms of our model, the value of the collaboration, if implemented jointly, is V . If, however, the collaboration were terminated prematurely, Mobil would likely be able to use some of what it learned from Badger to design a process using its zeolite catalyst to use in its own re…neries. Mobil would also probably try to license this catalyst technology through other engineering and design …rms. Combined, these e¤orts would yield Mobil F . Badger, on the other hand, would not be able to use Mobil's catalyst. However, the knowledge Badger gained would be useful with other zeolite-based catalytic re…ning systems, earning it A . Note that these alternatives are possible only if the collaboration is terminated. Indeed, to the extent that …rm A can use the knowledge it gains from the alliance without jeopardizing the alliance itself, these payo¤s would simply be added to both V and A , making the collaboration more attractive to A without making it less attractive to F . Our interest, on the other hand, is in "rival bene…ts"which can potentially jeopardize the collaboration by making it less attractive to the other partner. In terms of the example, if Badger were to o¤er zeolite-catalyst based technologies from other innovators to oil re…ners, it would likely cause Mobil to withdraw from the collaboration. Thus, Badger can earn A only by forgoing its share of V .
Clearly, F and A may both be positive since F and A may both learn something useful from their interaction that they can use to improve their existing products, though of course one partner may learn more than the other (e.g., F > A ). However, we also allow for situations where one partner is "expropriated" by the other (e.g., F > 0, A < 0). This is the "swimming with sharks" or "information leakage" scenario highlighted by a number of scholars. If the …rms decide to implement the project together, they must bargain over how to divide the resulting surplus V F A . We assume bargaining is e¢ cient and determined according to the Nash solution with equal weights. Thus, the partners'payo¤ are given by
That is, each …rm gets its new (after knowledge sharing) outside option i , plus half of the surplus from implementation, minus the costs of knowledge sharing 1 2 I. Knowledge sharing will occur only if each …rm i = F; A obtains more if both …rms share their knowledge than if both …rms do not share their knowledge:
We refer to (2) as i's knowledge sharing constraint. If this constraint holds, we say that knowledge sharing is privately pro…table for …rm i (assuming that the other …rm also shares knowledge). After some manipulations, A and B's knowledge sharing constraints can be rewritten as: Note that the shifts in bargaining positions as measured by j F A j only in ‡uence how the surplus generated by the alliance is divided between F and A. The condition for the e¢ ciency of knowledge sharing, V I, does not depend on the relative magnitudes of F and A (assuming F + A V ).
be relaxed (for instance by assuming that F incurs a fraction of the total knowledge sharing costs) without qualitatively changing any of the main results of the paper. 4 For completeness, we should also specify what happens in case of unilateral knowledge sharing. We assume that, if F shares knowledge with A but A does not, then F pays the knowledge sharing cost I and F enjoys a bene…t u F 0. Given that contracts on knowledge sharing are not enforceable, it should be clear that neither F nor A have any incentive to unilaterally share their knowledge. A …rm that did that would incur a cost ( 1 2 I) without enjoying any bene…t. In short, unilateral knowledge sharing cannot be an equilibrium of the game.
We can summarize the discussion above as follows. 5 Proposition 1. Knowledge sharing is e¢ cient when V I. However, it is privately pro…table for both …rms only when
Thus, in equilibrium there is an ine¢ ciently low level of knowledge sharing.
Proposition 1 captures the idea that some value-creating alliances may not be formed when knowledge
sharing creates large shifts in bargaining positions. Value creation is important, as highly valuable alliances (V I high) tend to be formed, but asymmetries in the evolution of outside options create a wedge between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient knowledge sharing. Preserving the balance of power within the partnership (a low F A in absolute value) helps reduce the risk of suboptimal knowledge sharing and collaboration.
One application of the model is to knowledge (mis)appropriation in alliances. A common concern is that one partner may learn information that belongs to the other partner and use it on alternative projects. For instance, a large pharmaceutical …rm may acquire valuable scienti…c information while collaborating with a biotech company. Then, the ex post outside option of the pharmaceutical …rm (say B ) would increase, while the ex post outside option of the biotech company ( A ) would not change or may even decrease. The appropriating …rm would then become less dependent on its partner, and may even lose interest in the collaboration (Arora and Merges, 2004; Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Katila et al., 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012; Hallen et al., 2014) .
Uncertainty
Strategic alliances, especially when the goal of the alliance is to develop new knowledge and products, are characterized by large uncertainty. Here we explore how di¤erent types of uncertainty a¤ect …rms' incentives to share knowledge. We …nd that, contrary to conventional wisdom, uncertainty often promotes knowledge sharing in our setting.
We begin with the case where there is uncertainty about the value of the synergies between F and A . Uncertainty is resolved after knowledge sharing but before implementation. Speci…cally, we assume 5 Because knowledge sharing only bene…ts a …rm if the other …rm also shares its knowledge and …rms choose their actions simultaneously and non-cooperatively, there is always the possibility of coordination failure. That is, even when condition (5) holds, partners may fail to share knowledge because they hold beliefs (correct in equilibrium) that the other partner will not share. We rule out this Pareto-inferior equilibrium on the grounds that alliance partners should be able to coordinate on a mutually bene…cial outcome.
that V is a random variable distributed with cumulative distribution function G over the support [V ; V ].
As before, following knowledge sharing, the partners'outside options also change, from (0; 0) to ( F ; A ).
We assume V > F + A > V , so that, if synergies V are low, it is e¢ cient to terminate the alliance after knowledge sharing. Firms are risk neutral.
In this setting, it is optimal for F to share knowledge (conditional on A sharing knowledge) if
Similarly, it is optimal for A to share knowledge (conditional on F sharing knowledge) if
Intuitively, if …rms share their knowledge, they appropriate their outside options ( F or A ) plus half of the surplus, which accrues only when synergies are su¢ ciently high (V F + A ). By contrast, the condition for e¢ cient knowledge sharing is
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium under synergy uncertainty and shows how greater uncertainty (modelled as a mean preserving spread of the original distribution G) a¤ects knowledge sharing.
Proposition 2.
(i). In equilibrium there is an ine¢ ciently low level of knowledge sharing.
(ii). Early termination of an alliance (before implementation) occurs with positive probability. Early termination, when it occurs, is always e¢ cient.
(iii). An increase in uncertainty about synergies makes knowledge sharing becomes more likely.
As in the model without uncertainty, the non-cooperative equilibrium exhibits an ine¢ ciently low level of knowledge sharing. However, unlike the baseline model, now an alliance can be terminated earlyafter knowledge sharing but before implementation-if synergies turn out to be low. Proposition 2 also
shows that the incentives for knowledge sharing are greater if there is more uncertainty about the value of synergies. Intuitively, a mean preserving spread of the distribution of V increases the likelihood of extreme (very low and very high) realizations of V . If V is very low, after knowledge sharing the partners can always obtain F and A . The downside is therefore limited. On the other hand, if V is very high, the partners can share this large value. This upside of knowledge sharing grows in importance as more extreme realizations of V become possible. In short, we …nd that there is an option value associated with knowledge sharing, and the value of that option increases with the level of uncertainty over synergies.
A similar intuition holds for other types of uncertainty. For instance, consider the case where there is uncertainty is about the strength of a partner's bargaining position after knowledge sharing (i.e., the uncertainty is about F or A ). More speci…cally, suppose V and A are known, while F is distributed over [ F ; F ] with cumulative distribution K. Thus, there is initially uncertainty about the value of F 's outside option. F is realized after knowledge sharing but before implementation. We assume that F A = 0. F A implies that knowledge sharing will occur if and only if the "weak" partner A's knowledge sharing constraint is satis…ed. Finally, we assume F < V < F , so that it is possible that the alliance is terminated after knowledge sharing but before implementation.
Perhaps surprisingly, we …nd that greater uncertainty about a partner's bargaining position can increase the incentives of the other partner to share knowledge.
Then, if uncertainty about F increases, in equilibrium knowledge sharing becomes more likely.
Proposition 3 shows that greater uncertainty about the outside option of the "strong" partner tends to increase the "weak" partner's incentives to share knowledge and hence the likelihood of knowledge sharing. The intuition for the result builds again on real-options logic. If the partners share knowledge and F turns out to be very high, A's losses are limited because A can always obtain A (= 0). By contrast, if F turns out to be very low, the partners will implement the project together and share the surplus V F . Clearly, A bene…ts if very small realizations of F become more likely. Because of this asymmetry in how A's payo¤ is a¤ected by more extreme realizations of F , greater uncertainty tends to increase A's incentives to share knowledge and hence knowledge sharing. 6
3 Encouraging knowledge sharing in alliances
So far we have shown that competitive tensions can lead to suboptimal levels of knowledge sharing. In the next three sections, we consider strategies that prospective partners can use to encourage knowledge sharing when competitive tensions are strong. These strategies include: (i) strategic investments in absorptive capacity, (ii) alliance portfolio management, and (iii) contractual solutions. Throughout, we will assume with no essential loss of generality that F is the "strong"partner, in the sense that F > A .
Thus, the binding knowledge sharing constraint will generally be that of the "weak" partner A. 7
Strategic investments in absorptive capacity
An in ‡uential literature in strategy stresses that attempts to appropriate the returns from collaboration may generate learning races, where partners try to absorb their partners'knowledge while attempting to protect their own (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998) . Our model suggests that, while appropriability concerns are important (the payo¤s i of both partners increase in their bargaining positions i ), an excessive focus on strengthening one own's bargaining position may be counterproductive because it may discourage knowledge sharing and collaboration ( F may be so large that (5) does not hold).
In this section we develop a simple extension of the model where …rms can invest in their ability to absorb external knowledge, which in turn improves their bargaining position vis-à-vis their partner. We show that, when the need of encouraging knowledge sharing is taken into account, …rms do not always want to maximize their receptivity to their partners' knowledge. Instead, they may sometimes intentionally limit their own learning capability to encourage participation. Thus, the model can potentially explain why in reality …rms seldom appear to exhibit a racing intent (Mowery et al., 1996; Hennart et al., 1999; Inkpen, 2000) and instead their behavior is more often best described as cooperative (Inkpen, 2005) .
We assume that, prior to the knowledge sharing phase, …rms can invest in their absorptive capacity.
These investments increase the payo¤ the payo¤ that …rm i = F; A can obtain after termination from L i to H i , where H i L i . Thus, the …rst stage of our game (where players invest in absorptive capacity) can be viewed as one where …rm F selects bargaining position F = f L F ; H F g and …rm A selects bargaining position A = f L A ; H A g: The learning race literature suggests that in an alliance, the "participating …rms [should] maximize their receptivity to the knowledge and skills of their partner while limiting the transparency of their own operations" (Mowery et al., 2002: 298 A . This implies that the focal …rm F is always the "stronger"(faster learning) partner, while A is always the "weaker"(slower learning) partner. All other features of the model in Section 2 remain the same.
Proposition 4 below shows that the learning race intuition is in general incorrect. Partners do sometimes engage in learning races and maximize their learning capability (case (iii) below). However, in some circumstances they purposefully limit their absorptive capacity and increase their partner's payo¤ (case (ii)). ( Proposition 4 shows that, when …rms are very asymmetric in terms of their learning potential (case (i)), knowledge sharing does not occur. Asymmetries between …rms are so strong that they lead to a breakdown of cooperation. The resulting outcome is ine¢ cient.
By contrast, when the …rms are su¢ ciently symmetric in terms of their learning potential (case (iii)), a learning race takes place. Both …rms maximally invest in learning, but this still leads to a fairly symmetric outcome. Thus, they still …nd it privately pro…table to share their knowledge.
The most interesting case arises when learning potential is asymmetric but not excessively so (case (ii)). A strategy of maximizing learning capability becomes self-defeating for the stronger partner F . By maximizing its learning capability, …rm F discourages the potential partner A from entering the alliance and sharing its knowledge. F is better o¤ by limiting its learning capability to just L F , thus acting in an apparently altruistic fashion.
There are many examples of …rms that appear to deliberately reduce their own absorptive capacity to mitigate the risk of con ‡icts with their partners. Cisco, for instance, is a …rm that has successfully managed a large number of alliances in a variety of sectors, geographies and technological areas. Cisco recognizes that con ‡icts can arise when partners are exposed to each other's knowledge. For instance, Steve Steinhilber, Vice President of strategic alliances at Cisco, notes that:
One of the most contentious issues in negotiating the con…dentiality terms of an alliance agreement is the treatment of residuals -that is, general knowledge, know-how, and the skills that each partner's employees will gain by being exposed to the other party's con…dential information (2008: 101 Steinhilber recommends that partners establish ground rules to manage information security and intellectual property rights. These rules should be designed not simply to protect one own's resources, but also to ensure that all the partners are treated fairly and nobody's knowledge is mishandled. In particular, Steinhilber suggests that …rewalls may also be created to prevent Cisco from learning too much from its partners. Speci…cally, he recommends:
Setting clear parameters in your agreements that identify the information to be shared and the permitted use of such information. In certain instances, it may be necessary to restrict information to some employees and to set up …rewalls to prevent tainting other groups within the company that are developing similar technology independently. [...] Setting up training and procedures to protect your partner's con…dential information and watching for actions by your partner that may signal an improper use of your own information (2008: 119; emphasis added).
The model could easily be modi…ed to examine the partners'incentives to limit the transparency of their own operations. The learning race literature suggests that …rms should minimize the transparency of their operations, thus reducing their partners' absorptive capacity. This suggests that F should take actions to minimize A , while A should take actions to minimize F . Arguments analogous to the ones presented above make clear that there are situations when a strong partner will …nd it bene…cial to "altruistically" increase the transparency of its own operations. An example would be Toyota's willingness to teach General Motors valuable lean manufacturing practices (Inkpen, 2005) .
Note that, in both in the case of Cisco and Toyota, it is the large or fast-learning …rm that appears to behave altruistically. Thus, "strong" partners do not always have to behave like "sharks". Instead, they can adopt calculative altruistic behaviors, motivated by the need of encouraging collaboration and knowledge sharing ex ante.
Knowledge sharing in alliance portfolios
A recent literature focuses on alliance portfolios and interdependencies among a focal …rm's alliance partners. At the risk of simplifying a complex subject, this literature argues that overlaps among the alliance partners reduces value: overlaps reduce the potential for synergies and increase the potential for con ‡ict among the partners. The result, according to this logic, is lower stability of alliances and lower value to the focal …rm (e.g., Vasudeva and Anand, 2011; Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011). 8 We examine the issue of substitutability through the lenses of our model. The key contribution of this section will be to distinguish between two di¤erent types of substitutability and show that there is a type of substitutability that facilitates, not hinder, knowledge sharing. We will also characterize how the payo¤ of a focal …rm varies with the similarity of its partners and show that, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, the focal …rm frequently bene…ts from choosing partners that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar from each other.
We focus on a simple setting where a focal partner F can collaborate with two …rms, A and B. We say that A and B are substitutes if they allow F to access similar pools of knowledge. We distinguish between two types of substitutability: substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival bene…ts.
Substitutability in implementation. Substitutability in implementation refers to situations where the contribution of a former partner, which may have been useful to implement a project, can partly be substituted by the contribution of a current partner. For instance, suppose F and A share knowledge to develop new arti…cial intelligence (AI) algorithms. If their alliance is prematurely terminated (after knowledge sharing but before implementation), F may be able to use some of the knowledge acquired from A to develop its own algorithms, to use in its own operations (a "rival" project). Importantly, the rival project can only be started if the alliance with A is terminated. This could be because F 's researchers, who were working with A, must be redeployed to work in-house on the rival project.
We posit that, if F terminates its collaboration with A and implements the rival project alone, it earns F A . Alternatively, F could ask one of its current partners to help. We assume that, if B helps with the implementation of the rival project, the value that F and B can create together is F A + s Im p . Thus, s Im p 0 measures the value of B's contribution to the implementation of the rival project. Since the rival project arises from interactions between F and A, it is reasonable to assume that the more similar A and B are, the larger s Im p will be. For instance, if B is also an AI …rm, s Im p may be large. By contrast, if B is a more traditional software development …rm, s Im p is likely to be small. We assume that, if the collaboration between F and B on their own project was prematurely terminated, B would not be willing to help F with the rival project.
Substitutability in rival bene…ts. Substitutability in rival bene…ts refers to situations where the knowledge gained by former partners is partly overlapping. For instance, suppose F and A share knowledge but their alliance is prematurely terminated. Then F may be able to use some of the knowledge acquired from A in its existing operations (a "rival" project), thus obtaining "rival" bene…ts F A . Similarly, if F and B share knowledge but their alliance is prematurely terminated, F may use some knowledge acquired from B to earn "rival" bene…ts F B .
Importantly, if both alliances are prematurely terminated, the rival bene…ts that accrue to F may not be F A + F B , but F A + F B s RB , where s RB 0 measures substitutability in rival bene…ts.
Substitutability in rival bene…ts re ‡ects the fact that A and B may give F access to similar, partly overlapping information. For instance, F may bene…t from additional expertise in developing semisupervised machine learning methods in areas such as image classi…cation. Redeploying in-house computer scientists previously working with either A or B may be very valuable, but redeploying internally both teams may yield diminishing returns, because some of what is learned from B has already been learned from A. 9
To simplify the analysis, for the rest of this section we will assume that A and B's outside options following knowledge sharing are A = B = 0, and F A = F B = F . These assumptions are just for simplicity and can easily be dropped without a¤ecting the qualitative results of the paper.
We begin with the case when F and A and F and B do not share knowledge. Then, F , A and B all obtain their baseline payo¤s, which are normalized to 0.
Next, suppose knowledge sharing occurs in one and only one alliance. For instance, suppose F and A share knowledge. Because B would not be part of any interaction, e¤ectively it would be as if B did not exist. The analysis would follow the same steps as in Section 2. We would have that knowledge sharing is e¢ cient if V I; however, it is privately pro…table for both F and A only if V I F . Thus, in a noncooperative equilibrium knowledge sharing occurs less often than socially optimal.
The …nal possibility is that knowledge sharing occurs in both alliances. We want to describe how much value is created by the …rms depending on implementation decisions. To do so, let v(S) be the value created by coalition S, where S 2 fF; A; B; F A; F B; AB; F ABg. Thus, for instance, v(F AB) denotes the value created by F , A and B working together; that is, when both F and A and F and B implement their projects together (no alliance is prematurely terminated). Similarly, v(F A) denotes the value created by F and A working together, and the alliance between F and B was prematurely terminated. The value or 'worth'of the empty coalition ? is always zero: v(?) = 0. All these values are gross of knowledge sharing costs.
We assume that the value that coalition F AB can create is v(F AB) = 2V + b. 2V is the 'baseline' value of the projects that F and A and F and B implement. In addition, the coalition also obtains the synergistic bene…t b 0. b captures complementarities or synergies between A and B in implementation.
By combining A and B's capabilities during the implementation stage, the coalition F AB creates b more value than if A and B were involved in two completely unrelated alliances.
where the help of scientists previously working with A or B is useful. But the basic idea of decreasing marginal returns to redeployment applies also when there are multiple projects. To see that, suppose for instance that F can use expertise in AI to develop algorithms for image classi…cation and speech recognition. Such expertise is worth rival bene…ts if scientists are working on image classi…cation, and if scientists are working on speech recognition, with > . Assuming that the expertise from A or B is equally valuable in either project, prematurely terminating either alliance and redeploying the scientists internally will yield rival bene…ts . However, terminating the second alliance as well will only yield . Internal redeployment exhibits decreasing marginal returns.
If instead the alliance between F and B is terminated before implementation, by working together F One and only one collaboration is terminated prematurely
Both collaborations are terminated prematurely
Following Hart and Moore (1990) , we use the Shapley value to assign payo¤s to individual …rms. If knowledge sharing occurs, then the "grand coalition" F AB will emerge because it creates the greatest 1 0 We could also examine complementarities in rival bene…ts by simply letting s RB < 0. Such complementarities would arise, for instance, if a large, critical mass of AI scientists is necessary to successfully implement a rival project. total value. 11 The Shapley value assigns each …rm its expected marginal contribution assuming that the order in which they joint the grand coalition is random. Formally, for i = F; A; B and any subset of …rms S N = fF; A; Bg, the value assigned to …rm i is:
where jSj denotes the number of …rms in S and, for any positive integer r, r! = 1 2 ::: r, and 0! = 1.
The Shapley value yields the expressions for the …rms'(gross) payo¤s: 12
Note that F + A + B = v (F AB). This follows from the e¢ ciency property of the Shapley value.
As the single alliance case, the fact that F can use the knowledge learnt from its partners on rival projects shifts the balance of power in its favor-F gets an additional Proposition 5 shows that, unlike in the single alliance scenario, in the alliance portfolio case ine¢ ciently low levels of knowledge sharing can arise not only because the "weak" partners A and B are adversely a¤ected by shifts in bargaining positions, but also because the "strong"partner F has too little incentive to collaborate.
Proposition 5. In the alliance portfolio case, knowledge sharing can be ine¢ ciently low because (i) the non-focal …rms A and B are adversely a¤ ected by shifts in bargaining positions, or because (ii) F appropriates too small a fraction (1/3) of the synergistic value b.
The "strong" partner F might ine¢ ciently choose not to share knowledge with its partners when the gains from collaboration mostly come from the synergistic value b. Because agreement of all three partners is needed for b to be achieved, F can only appropriate one third of this value. However, F must incur half of all knowledge sharing costs. Because bene…ts and costs are not equally shared, ine¢ ciencies can result.
To simplify the exposition and facilitate the comparison between the single and the portfolio alliance cases, in the following we will assume that V I. This implies that ine¢ ciencies in the portfolio case can only originate from shifts in bargaining positions, as in the single alliance case. That is, the knowledge sharing condition F 0 always holds, and the only knowledge sharing constraints that may not hold are those of the "weak" partners (i.e., the condition A = B 1 2 I).
We have the following.
Proposition 6. Suppose V I. In alliance portfolios:
(i). Substitutability in rival bene…ts facilitates knowledge sharing, while substitutability in implementation hinders it. Synergies in implementation also facilitate knowledge sharing.
(ii). Synergies in implementation have a larger e¤ ect in facilitating knowledge sharing than substitutability in implementation has in hindering it. More precisely, suppose b = k 1 + and s Im p = k 2 + .
Then knowledge sharing in alliance portfolios becomes more likely as grows.
All these comparative statics results follow from the knowledge sharing constraints of the "weak" partners:
The analysis suggests two reasons why substitutability may not be as bad at discouraging knowledge sharing as generally thought. First, we identify a type of substitutability, substitutability in rival bene…ts, which facilitates rather than hinder knowledge sharing. Second, we show that synergies in implementation b have a larger e¤ect in facilitating knowledge sharing than substitutability in implementation s Im p has in hindering it. The reason, as mentioned above, is that substitutability in implementation has some bene…cial e¤ects for non-focal partners. A non-focal partner may lose a lot when it is replaced, but it may also gain a little when it is instrumental in replacing another non-focal partner.
A second straightforward implication of our analysis is that knowledge sharing in a portfolio may be sustainable, while knowledge sharing in a single alliance may be not.
sharing in a portfolio is sustainable, while knowledge sharing in a single alliance is not.
What is interesting about this result is that it remains true even if there are no synergies between partners (b = 0), because substitutability in rival bene…ts also facilitates knowledge sharing. Proposition 7 suggests that a way to encourage knowledge sharing in a dyadic alliance where competitive tensions are present may be introduce a third partner. This strategy may be bene…cial not only when there are synergies in implementation between the non-focal partners, but also when the knowledge that the focal …rm can absorb from its non-focal partners and use in other rival projects is largely overlapping.
Besides selecting the "right" number of partners, a focal …rm must also select partners with suitable characteristics. The question we ask is the following: Should the focal …rm F choose non-focal partners that are similar to each other (i.e., with a large degree of substitutability), or partners that are di¤erent from each other (with a low degree of substitutability)?
To answer this question, let s Im p = and s RB = (1 ) . The parameter 0 measures the degree of similarity between A and B. A high degree of similarity between A and B increases both substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival bene…ts. 2 [0; 1] is a parameter capturing to what extent substitutability in implementation is more important than substitutability in rival bene…t.
If = 1, then only substitutability in implementation matters. If = 0, then only substitutability in rival bene…t is important. By varying , we can examine how our results depend on the type of substitutability.
Proposition 8 below shows that, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, F should often choose partners that are neither too similar or too dissimilar from each other. ).
(ii). If < ). 13 Proposition 8 suggests that the relationship between the value that F can appropriate and the degree of similarity of its alliance partners is typically non-monotonic. The reason is that there are in general 1 3 For completeness, we also have that, if = 1 2
, then F 's equilibrium payo¤ is independent of and equal to V I +v + two con ‡icting e¤ects at play: (i) on the focal …rm's payo¤ conditional on knowledge sharing and (ii) on the weak partners'incentives to share knowledge.
Consider substitutability in implementation …rst. A high degree of similarity between non-focal partners bene…ts F conditional on knowledge sharing because it strengthens F 's bargaining power. However, too much similarity reduces the non-focal partners'incentives to share knowledge, with detrimental e¤ects on F as well. Thus, the optimum level of similarity between non-focal partners from F 's viewpoint is intermediate (Proposition 8, case (iv) ).
When substitutability is in rival bene…ts, these e¤ects are reversed. Partner similarity harms F conditional on knowledge sharing, but also induces the non-focal partners to share knowledge. Initially (for low levels of similarity), knowledge sharing in an alliance portfolio is not sustainable, and F 's payo¤ is low. However, when crosses , knowledge sharing becomes sustainable, so F 's payo¤ suddenly rises.
As grows further, substitutability in rival bene…ts monotonically reduces F 's payo¤ (Proposition 8,
Thus, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, F is often better o¤ by choosing partners that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar to each other. The relationship between F 's payo¤ and non-focal partner similarity has often an inverted-U shape (cases (i) and (iv)).
This basic intuition is complicated by the fact that initial conditions also matter. Depending on the initial propensity of its alliance partners to share knowledge (whether V I F + 2 3 b 7 0), only part of the inverted-U curve may be observed. Case (ii) describes a situation where, because substitutability is mostly in rival bene…ts ( < 1 2 ) and knowledge sharing can always be sustained, partner similarity is always detrimental to F . Hence the optimal value of partner similarity from F 's viewpoint is zero. Case (iii) describes a situation where knowledge sharing can never be sustained. In that case, because there is no knowledge sharing, the degree of partner similarity is inconsequential.
The complexity of these predictions may help explain the variety of often con ‡icting empirical …nd-ings. Consistent with prediction of an inverted-U relationship between the value appropriated by the focal partner and the similarity of the non-focal partners, Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) …nd that alliance announcements create value (i.e., abnormal stock returns) especially when the degree to which the …rm's network of alliances involves …rms that possess nonredundant knowledge, skills, and capabilities is moderate. Vasudeva and Anand (2011) …nd an inverted U-shaped relationship between the technological diversity in a focal …rm's alliance portfolio and the likelihood that the focal …rm cites its partner's patents. However, Cui and O'Connor (2012) …nd no statistically signi…cant relationship between alliance portfolio resource diversity and innovation, although several interaction e¤ects are signi…cant (consistent with (iii)), while Goerzen and Beamish (2005) and Cui (2013) …nd monotonic relationships (consistent with (ii), or with only a portion of an inverted-U shape being observed). 14 Evidence inconsistent with our theory would …nd a U-shaped relationship between a focal partner's value appropriation and the similarity of its partners. We are not aware of any empirical work documenting such relationship.
Contractual solutions
In this section, we brie ‡y discuss why contractual solutions are of limited use.
Payments to share knowledge. Payments provided by the "strong"partner to the "weak"partner to encourage the weak partner to enter an alliance and share knowledge do not solve the problems associated with shifting bargaining positions. The reason is that knowledge sharing is not observable by a court.
Thus, the weak partner would sign the contract, accept the payment, and then would not share knowledge if that was not in its own interest. This logic is similar to the problem with termination fee contracts.
Termination fee contracts. Termination fee contracts may appear to be a potential solution to the problems highlighted in this paper. However, they will work only under very stringent assumptions. To see this, recall from Section 2 that …rms F and A share knowledge only if both their knowledge sharing constrains are met:
Suppose collaboration is e¢ cient (V I) and F is the strong partner ( F > A ). Furthermore, for the problem to be interesting suppose that, in the absence of contracts, collaboration cannot be sustained because it is not su¢ ciently pro…table for the weak partner (V F + A I fails).
To avoid this problem, suppose F o¤ers a contract to A that pays x to A if F terminates the contract.
In this case, once knowledge sharing has occurred, F 's outside option is F x, and A's outside option is A + x. 15 The new gross payo¤s that accrue to F and A after negotiations are thus, respectively,
For knowledge sharing to occur, we need it to be pro…table for the weak partner:
This condition can be rewritten as
By setting x =
, …rm F can induce …rm A to share knowledge.
The ability of termination fees to induce knowledge sharing, however, is limited. One important reason is that the contract may induce the weak partner A to behave opportunistically. Speci…cally, A may not share knowledge, which may force F to terminate the collaboration, resulting in a payment of x to A: Note that this payment is less than A's payo¤ from not reneging and sharing knowledge,
only if ( F A ) (V I) > 0, which cannot true (because we assumed V F + A I fails). That is, a contract that encourages knowledge sharing also tends to encourage opportunistic behavior by A.
Thus, termination fees will not help unless the courts can indemnify F against reneging by A:
Another issue with termination-fee contracts relates to their enforceability. In practice, U.S. courts have refused to enforce breach damages that are deemed to be excessive (Chung, 1998) . This suggests that, if x is 'too high'to be enforceable by courts, then F will not be able to induce A to share knowledge.
Moreover, x will be high precisely in situations with particularly large shifts in bargaining positions that threaten collaboration incentives.
Conclusion
Firms enter into alliances for a variety of reasons: to facilitate collusion and increase market power (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Hagedoorn, 1993; Nakamura et al., 1996) , to share risks and take advantage of new opportunities (Kogut, 1991; Gulati et al., 2000) , to pool resources with other …rms (Williamson, 1985; Hennart, 1988) and to acquire new skills and capabilities (Hamel, 1991; Mowery et al., 1996; Khanna et al., 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) .
In this paper, we have focused on alliances where an important objective is the acquisition of new skills and capabilities ("learning alliances"), but where contracts are incomplete and …rms cannot commit to exploit the newly created knowledge jointly. Firms share knowledge to create value (e.g., new products).
However, knowledge sharing also creates agency hazards. For instance, a …rm may steal a partner's trade secrets, or asymmetric learning may occur. In the latter case, the faster learner may over time be able to reduce its dependency on the partner and appropriate a greater share of the collaborative pie. All these risks, if foreseen, can discourage knowledge sharing, unless contractual or other types of safeguards exist.
This paper contributes to the literature on learning in alliances, and provides a di¤erent perspective on learning races. Many if not most of the learning race view's recommendations su¤er from a failure to recognize that the processes of value creation and value appropriation are inextricably linked. Indeed, as Zeng and Hennart (2002: 193) argue, "[e] ¤orts at increasing one's value extraction from a joint venture often damage cooperation and negatively impact value creation." Scholars also argue that the notion of a race to learn may be "largely unrealistic," for it is unclear what motivates a likely loser to join a race (Inkpen, 2002: 272) . In this paper we incorporate a knowledge sharing constraint into a model of learning in alliances, and show that its inclusion has important consequences for both how alliances should be managed and how partner should be selected.
This perspective yields nuanced predictions. In some cases, the stronger partner may limit its own ability to learn, as Cisco does, or help enhance the learning ability of its partners. Indeed, in some cases, …rms appear to go to great lengths to facilitate their partner's learning e¤orts, even when these partners are competitors in the product market. In a study of American-Japanese joint ventures in the automo-tive industry, Inkpen (1998) reports many instances of Japanese …rms facilitating technology transfer to American partners through training of American engineers, temporary redeployment of personnel and transfer of equipment designs. We also …nd nuanced results regarding alliance portfolios. The simple intuition that alliance portfolios should be constructed to minimize overlap in technology among partners is potentially misleading when we consider learning alliances and incomplete contracts.
A distinguishing feature of our work is that we focus on the strategies that leading …rms can use to encourage knowledge sharing ex ante, rather than on the better understood issue of how weak partner can protect their knowledge in alliances. In that respect, our analysis shares a ‡avour with contributions emphasizing the role of "keystone" …rms in sharing the bene…ts from collaboration with partners, rather than appropriating the bene…ts (Iansiti and Levien, 2004) .
Alliances are by de…nition not zero-sum games. Instead, they have the potential to create value. Value capture strategies must be balanced against the need to ensure value creation. Our focus on the need to induce knowledge sharing by the weaker partner is, at the most abstract level, an attempt put the emphasis back on value creation.
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
The proofs of Propositions 1, 6 and 7 follow directly from the discussion in the main body of the paper.
Below, we prove Propositions 2 to 5 and 8.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) By adding (6) and (7), we obtain (8). Thus, if the …rms share knowledge, it must be e¢ cient. The converse is obviously not true.
(ii) Early termination of an alliance (after knowledge sharing but before implementation) occurs when V < F + A ; that is, with probability G( F + A ).
(iii). Let V and V 0 be random variables with cumulative distributions G and H, respectively. Let H be a mean preserving spread of G. Thus, V 0 is more "risky"than V . We wish to show that incentives for knowledge sharing are greater under distribution H than under distribution G. To do so, de…ne
Because F is convex in V and H is a mean preserving spread of G, Theorem 2 in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
Thus …rm F has a greater incentive to share knowledge (conditional on A's sharing knowledge) under
completely analogous argument proves that A has a greater incentive to share knowledge (conditional on F 's sharing knowledge) under H than under G. This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let F and 0 F be random variables distributed over [ F ; F ] with cumulative distribution functions K and Q, respectively. Let Q be a mean preserving spread of K. Thus, 0 F is more "risky" than F . Suppose F A = 0 and F < V < F . We wish to show that incentives for knowledge sharing are greater under distribution Q than under distribution K.
We have that it is optimal for F to share knowledge (conditional on A sharing knowledge) if Z
Also, it is optimal for A to share knowledge (conditional on F sharing knowledge) if
Clearly if (13) holds, then also (12) holds. Thus, in the non-cooperative equilibrium knowledge sharing will occur if and only if A's knowledge sharing constraint is satis…ed.
Because A is convex in F and Q is a mean preserving spread of K, Theorem 2 in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
Thus A has a greater incentive to share knowledge under distribution Q than under distribution K. This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Assumptions V I and L F H
A imply that F 's knowledge sharing constraint is always satis…ed. The only knowledge sharing constraint that may not be satis…ed is A's. From (??), it is clear that, by selecting A = H A , …rm A will maximize both the probability of knowledge sharing and its share of the alliance returns. Thus, if knowledge sharing takes place, …rm A will select A = H A . Consider the problem …rm F faces. The objective of …rm A is to maximize its own payo¤ with respect
subject to A's knowledge sharing constraint being met
and …rm A choosing A = H A . (If A's knowledge sharing constraint is not met, then F 's payo¤ is 0. This is clearly worse than what F can obtain with knowledge sharing.) From (14) , it is clear that F will choose the highest value of F compatible with (15) being met when
then there is no value of F that can induce A to share knowledge sharing. Thus, knowledge sharing does not occur.
then F = L F and knowledge sharing occurs. If
then F = H F and knowledge sharing occurs. This proves Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. We can write the conditions for knowledge sharing to be privately pro…table for all partners as 
F maximizes (16) with respect to 0 subject to (17). Proposition 7 follows immediately from inspection of equations (16)-(17).
Appendix B: A dynamic model of knowledge sharing
In the basic model in Section 2, there is only one round of knowledge sharing. Here we develop a multistage, optimal stopping game of knowledge sharing, and show that our key qualitative results are robust. Consider a collaboration between two in…nitely-lived …rms (or partners). Time is discrete. In each period t = 1; 2::: + 1; the …rms decide whether or not they want to continue their collaboration. If the partnership is terminated at time t, then each partner i = A; B receives a payo¤ i;t . This payo¤ depends on whether the partners reach an agreement at time t concerning the division of the joint value. If they reach an agreement, then they split a joint payo¤ of R t . If not, each party obtains its outside option i;t . As standard in the incomplete contract literature, R t is assumed to be observable but not veri…able. Moreover, bargaining is assumed to be e¢ cient and determined according to the Nash solution with equal weights. Thus, if the partnership is terminated at time t, i's payo¤ is given by i;t = This implies that when the agreement is e¢ cient (R t A;t + B;t ), the parties receive their outside options plus and equal fraction of the surplus. To focus on ine¢ cient termination, we will typically assume unless otherwise speci…ed that R t A;t + B;t for all t. E¤ective collaboration requires investment by both partners to create joint value. Speci…cally, e¤ective collaboration requires each partner to exert unobservable e¤ort at private cost 1 2 I, I > 0. If both parties exert e¤ort (i.e., collaborate, invest), then in period t + 1 the joint payo¤ and outside options are (R t+1 ; A;t+1 ; B;t+1 ). We assume R 1 < 1 and decreasing marginal returns to investment: R t+1 R t for all t, where R t R t+1 R t . If at t at least one party does not invest, then the partnership is terminated with payo¤s (R t ; A;t ; B;t ). 16 Note that the assumptions that investment is unobservable and R t is non-veri…able imply that partners cannot contract on e¤ort.
To characterize the solution to this stopping game, some notation must be introduced. A policy is a rule for choosing when to stop. Let V i;t denote the i's maximum expected return at time t, conditional on j 6 = i never stopping. An optimal policy for i for this auxiliary problem exists and can be found by solving the optimality equation V i;t = max i;t ; 1 2 I + V i;t+1 (see, e.g., Ross, 1983) . Let
be the set of periods t for which i …nds that stopping is at least as good as investing for exactly one period and then stopping. The one-stage look-ahead policy for i is de…ned as the policy that stops the …rst time the process enters a state in Z i . The following result is standard (see Ross, 1983: 54-55) .
Result (*). Suppose Z i is a closed sets of states. Then the one-stage look-ahead policy for the auxiliary problem is optimal for i = A; B.
Result (*) states that, provided that B (respectively, A) keeps investing, then for A (respectively, B) it is optimal to stop whenever stopping now is better than stopping the next period. Result (*) applies for instance, when it is 'concave' in t (i.e., it is decreasing). Then in fact, if it 1 2 I holds for some t 0 , it must also hold for all t 00 > t 0 (Z i is a closed sets of states). Obviously if it is decreasing, then as soon as it 1 2 I partner i should stop investing. Focusing on partner A and assuming that partner B always invests, Result (*) implies that A will stop at time T A , where T A is the smallest t such that i;T A i;T A +1 Thus B stops earlier if the partnership is no longer very productive (as before) and its relative bargaining power starts to decline. Since the partnership terminates when either party stops investing, the actual stopping time is given by T = min[T A ; T B ]
or equivalently R T I j A;T B;T j .
Note that if investment could be contracted upon, then the relationship would be terminated as soon as
Proposition A summarizes our …ndings.
Proposition A. Suppose that an agreement is always e¢ cient and Z A and Z B are closed sets of states. Then the collaboration is terminated at time T , where T is the smallest t satisfying R T I j A;T B;T j .
Thus, compared to an e¢ cient solution, in the non-cooperative equilibrium the collaboration terminates ine¢ ciently early.
This proposition is very similar to Proposition 1 in the main body of the paper. It shows that collaboration is more likely to be terminated ine¢ ciently early if continuation creates large shifts in bargaining power.
